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Unfit to Be Seen: Customer Preferences and the 




Disability discrimination is a persistent and pervasive problem. Its 
history in the United States stretches from the "ugly laws" of the late-
1800s to modern-day employment discrimination. In general, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits employers from dis-
criminating against disabled employees and job applicants. Employers 
often disregard this law, however, in order to cater to the untoward 
preferences of their customers. In theory, customer preferences are not 
a defense to discrimination, unless they pertain to safety, privacy, or 
authenticity. In practice, however, many courts seem to recognize an 
unseemly fourth exception to the general rule against customer pref-
erence-based defenses. This occurs when disabled persons are deemed 
"unfit to be seen." 
This Note first chronicles the history of the ADA and the eco-
nomic and psychological realities of customer preference-based de-
fenses. It then describes instances in which the "unfit to be seen" strain 
of the defense has been recognized by courts and analyzes its legiti-
macy. This Note concludes that the defense is contrary to the text of 
the ADA, the intentions of the legislature, and the ADA's underlying 
policies. As such, Congress and the judiciary should act to repudiate it. 
In the alternative, this Note proposes standards that courts should con-
sider in evaluating customer preference-based defenses to disability 
discrimination. 
fK=fåíêçÇìÅíáçå=
Persons with disabilities have long been discriminated against by 
society in general and by employers specifically.1 In 1990, Congress 
 
 1.  This Note uses the terms "persons with disabilities," "disabled persons," "disabled 
individuals," and "disabled people" interchangeably. Terms that omit the humanity of disabled 
persons such as "the disabled" are disfavored, as are many terms used in former statutes and 
caselaw, such as "handicapped" or "crippled." See, e.g., Disability Language Style Guide, 
NATIONAL CENTER ON DISABILITY AND JOURNALISM, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY (2018), 
https://ncdj.org/style-guide/ (describing these conventions). 
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enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to help correct this 
historical injustice.2 Congress reaffirmed its opposition to disability 
discrimination again in 2008 by enacting the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA),3 which abrogated several limiting 
Supreme Court decisions. Despite the plain language of the ADA's 
text, the act's legislative history, and its underlying policies, some 
courts have undermined the statute by allowing employer defenses4 
based on untoward customer preferences.5 The customer preference 
defense asserts that, because businesses could lose customers by em-
ploying disabled persons, employers may have legitimate reasons for 
discriminating against disabled employees and job applicants. While 
customer preference-based defenses that pertain to safety, privacy, and 
authenticity have been recognized in other contexts, courts applying 
the ADA have also allowed defenses based merely on customer aver-
sion to disabled persons. This Note calls upon Congress and the courts 
to disallow this practice; in addition, it proposes heightened standards 
to be met in the case of permissible customer preference-based de-
fenses. 
Part I.A describes the history of disability discrimination in the 
United States and the historical context of the ADA and ADAAA. Part 
I.B addresses the psychology, economics, and reality of untoward cus-
tomer preferences. Part I.C then describes the judiciary's history of 
intolerance for customer preference-based defenses under other anti-
 
 2.  Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018)). The ADA has four titles. The first covers employment. 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2018). The second covers public services. Id. §§ 12131–12165. The 
third covers public accommodations and private services. Id. §§ 12181–12189. The fourth covers 
miscellaneous provisions. Id. §§ 12201–12213. Congressional findings, the act's purpose state-
ment, and definitions are found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12103. 
 3.  Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 
Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213). 
 4.  These defenses usually take the form of bona fide occupational qualifications 
(BFOQs), as first contemplated by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which allow employers to escape 
liability for discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2018). This Note focuses on this type of 
defense, and thus disparate treatment cases rather than disparate impact cases. See, e.g., Patrol-
men's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 74 F. Supp. 2d 321, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[t]he 
primary affirmative defense provided by Title VII in a disparate treatment case is the BFOQ"). 
 5.  This Note focuses on customer preferences, but the untoward preferences of disabled 
employees' coworkers, supervisors, vendors, etc. may also motivate employers to take discrimi-
natory employment actions. Employers' incentives to cater to the preferences of these third par-
ties are unlikely to be as strong as incentives to cater to customer preferences, however. See gen-
erally Dallan F. Flake, Employer Liability for Non-Employee Discrimination, 58 B.C. L. REV. 
1169 (2017). 
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discrimination statutes, as well as the exceptions for preferences con-
cerning safety, privacy, and authenticity. Part I.C identifies numerous 
instances in which courts have allowed employers to discriminate 
against disabled employees because their disabilities have allegedly 
rendered them "unfit" to interact with or be seen by customers.6 
Part II.A shows that this "unfit to be seen" exception is contrary to 
the text of the ADA and argues that sublimating untoward customer 
preferences is a reasonable accommodation. Part II.B confirms this 
reading of the ADA by looking to the legislative history of the act. Part 
II.C identifies the two major policies behind the ADA—limiting the 
costs of compliance and ensuring fair treatment for disabled employ-
ees—and argues that disallowing the "unfit to be seen" exception ful-
fills both. Part II.D proposes additional guidelines courts may use to 
ensure compliance with the ADA's text and purpose. This Note con-
cludes by calling upon Congress and the courts to implement such 
standards and to repudiate the "unfit to be seen" strain of the customer 
preference defense. 
ffK=`ìëíçãÉê=mêÉÑÉêÉåÅÉë=~åÇ=aáë~Äáäáíó=aáëÅêáãáå~íáçå=
Disability discrimination has historically been, and still is, a vexing 
social problem. Though Congress enacted the ADA to curb this type 
of discrimination, the psychology of untoward customer preferences 
and the economic incentives businesses have to heed their customers 
mean that employers frequently attempt to subvert antidiscrimination 
laws. Though courts have traditionally been intolerant of customer 
preference-based defenses within the context of Title VII and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), they have displayed more 
deference to the animus of employers' customers within the context of 
the ADA. 
A. Historical Background 
In the United States, discrimination against disabled persons has a 
long history, both in employment and in other contexts.7 In 1990, 
 
 6.  The documentation of this trend is likely the most significant contribution of this 
Note. 
 7.  See infra Part I.A.1. 
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Congress enacted the ADA in an attempt to combat this history of dis-
crimination, but the act was quickly defanged in the courts.8 In 2008, 
Congress enacted the ADAAA, which reaffirmed the legislature's com-
mitment to combatting disability discrimination.9 Nonetheless, dis-
crimination against disabled persons remains a problem today. 
1. History of disability discrimination 
The United States has historically treated persons with disabilities 
shamefully. Americans' attitudes towards disabled persons have tradi-
tionally been characterized by fear, paternalism, ignorance, and low 
expectations. Lamentably, these attitudes remain largely intact today. 
Though society's attitudes toward disability have changed over 
time, the one constant has been negativity.10 Throughout most of the 
United States' history, disabled persons were kept out of sight and out 
of mind.11 During the mid- and late-1800s, many states and localities 
codified this norm, passing "ugly laws" that made it illegal for "[a]ny 
person, who is diseased, maimed, mutilated or in any way deformed so 
as to be an unsightly or disgusting object . . . [to] expose himself or 
herself to public view."12 These laws reflected public perception, as dis-
abled persons were often described with such dehumanizing terms as 
"vermin," "roadblock[s]," "affront to the public eye," "horrible," "hid-
eous," "monstrosities," "half-human," and "repulsive."13 
Attitudes toward persons with disabilities did not shift much dur-
ing the early-1900s, and some states even passed laws which prescribed 
forced sterilization for the "treatment" of disabled persons.14 While 
 
 8.  See infra Part I.A.2. 
 9.  See id. See infra Part I.A.3 for a discussion of the substantive provisions of the ADA. 
 10.  See, e.g., Adrienne Phelps Coco, Diseased, Maimed, Mutilated: Categorizations of 
Disability and an Ugly Law in Late Nineteenth-Century Chicago, 44 GEO. MASON J. SOC. HIST. 
23, 23–24 (2010) (documenting negative attitudes towards disabled persons); see also David M. 
Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educational Rights and the Construction 
of Difference, 1991 DUKE L.J. 166, 183 (1991) (citing changes in attitudes regarding foot binding 
to argue that disability is a construct). 
 11.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2018) ("historically, society has tended to isolate and 
segregate individuals with disabilities"); Arlene Mayerson, The History of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, DISABILITY RTS. EDUC. & DEF. FUND (1992), https://dredf.org/about-us/pub-
lications/the-history-of-the-ada/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2019, 5:51 PM); UNIVERSITY OF 
MINNESOTA, Disability History Timeline, http://www.d.umn.edu/cla/faculty/tbacig/stud-
proj/is3099/pplfrst/Untitled1.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2019, 5:46 PM). 
 12.  See, e.g., Coco, supra note 10, at 23 (quoting Chicago's ugly law). 
 13.  Id. at 31–32 (quoting various newspapers). 
 14.  See, e.g., Eric Mennel, Payments Start for N.C. Eugenics Victims, But Many Won't 
Qualify, NPR (Oct. 31, 2014, 5:04 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
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this practice was challenged in court, the Supreme Court endorsed it. 
The words of Justice Holmes encapsulated beliefs held by many Amer-
icans that disabled persons were incompetent, unfit, likely to starve 
without assistance, predisposed to commit murder, and that it would 
be "better for all the world" to prevent them from "continuing their 
kind."15 Justice Holmes's opinion is as remarkable for its brevity16 as it 
is for its callous attitude and prejudice.17 
Today, society still characterizes persons with disabilities nega-
tively, frequently due to misconceptions, ignorance, and the continu-
ing effects of past prejudice.18 Virtually every aspect of disabled per-
sons' tastes, interests, and personalities are attributed to disability, and 
impairment eclipses sex, race, age, occupation, and family in shaping 
how others think of persons with disabilities.19 Disabled individuals are 
seen as helpless, fueling beliefs that they are unable to perform even 
minimal essential job functions.20 Society tends to focus on disabled 
persons' deficits and on what they cannot do instead of what they can 
do.21 And disabled individuals are still frequently shunned, ostracized, 
and institutionalized.22 
2. Historical context of the ADA and the ADAAA 
The legislative response to the United States' history of disability 
discrimination was slow to develop. During the early 1900s, advocacy 
groups for persons with disabilities first began to form, though little 
substantive progress was made.23 During the 1950s and 1960s, reform-
 
shots/2014/10/31/360355784/payments-start-for-n-c-eugenics-victims-but-many-wont-qualify 
(describing North Carolina's forced sterilization law and modern developments pertaining to it). 
 15.  Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
 16.  The opinion spans only nine pages. See id. at 200. 
 17.  See id. at 207 ("[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough"). 
 18.  See, e.g., Hanoch Livneh, On the Origins of Negative Attitudes Toward People with 
Disabilities, 43 REHABILITATION LITERATURE 338 (1982). 
 19.  David Wasserman et al., Disability: Definitions, Models, Experience, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 1 (May 23, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/disability/. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Engel, supra note 10, at 181–82. 
 22.  See, e.g., Kiela Parks, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Colorado Continues to Warehouse 
Mentally Ill Prisoners in Solitary, ACLU (Aug. 6, 2013, 11:31 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/ 
prisoners-rights/cruel-inhuman-and-degrading-conditions/out-sight-out-mind-colorado-con-
tinues. 
 23.  Perri Meldon, Disability History: The Disability Rights Movement, U.S. NATIONAL 
WESTERGARD REVIEWED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2020  9:39 AM 
_vr=gçìêå~ä=çÑ=mìÄäáÅ=i~ï  [Vol. 34 
184 
ers were successful in advancing civil rights for women and racial mi-
norities, which helped pave the way for disability rights advocates.24 In 
1973, Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of disability by recipients of federal funds.25 
This legislation was particularly significant because it marked the first 
time individuals with disabilities were viewed as a discrete class rather 
than as dissimilar individuals suffering from various illnesses and im-
pairments.26 In 1975, Congress also passed the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act, which required public schools receiving 
federal funding to provide equal educational access for children with 
disabilities.27 
Two major protests also played important roles in the passage of 
the ADA. In 1977, disabled individuals across the country participated 
in a sit-in at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) in order to ensure that the department promulgated adequate 
regulations for the Rehabilitation Act.28 Besides ensuring that HEW's 
regulations gave force to the act, the sit-in helped shape disability dis-
crimination as a civil rights issue rather than one of pity or charity.29 
In 1988, the legislation that would later become the ADA was in-
troduced, but it was repeatedly delayed, due in part to private sector 
lobbying.30 In spite of these delays, the legislation enjoyed bipartisan 
support and encountered "no serious opposition" in Congress.31 The 
legislation was largely modeled after the Rehabilitation Act,32 and it 
 
PARK SERVICE (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.nps.gov/articles/disabilityhistoryrightsmove-
ment.htm. 
 24.  Id.; Mayerson, supra note 11. 
 25.  Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. §§ 701–97 (2018)). The Rehabilitation Act foreshadowed many of the provisions of 
the ADA. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 26.  Mayerson, supra note 11. 
 27.  Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (cod-
ified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–82 (2018)). 
 28.  Mayerson, supra note 11. 
 29.  Meldon, supra note 23. 
 30.  Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988, S. 2345, 100th Cong. (1988); see also Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act of 1989, S. 933, 101st Cong. (1989). See infra Part II.B for further 
discussion of the ADA's legislative history. 
 31.  Ruth Colker, The ADA's Journey Through Congress, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 
2 (2004); see also 134 CONG. REC. 9386, 22, 212–13 (1988) (disability legislation had bipartisan 
support and both candidates in the 1988 presidential election were likely to sign it). 
 32.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 31 (1990); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 9, 25 
(1989) (using the same three-pronged definition of disability as in the Rehabilitation Act). 
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expressly approved of the Supreme Court's liberal construction of the 
act in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.33 
On March 12, 1990, disabled individuals purposefully discarded 
wheelchairs, walkers, and other mobility aids in order to ascend the 
steps of the Capitol Building in Washington, D.C.34 This "Capitol 
Crawl" called attention to the daily struggles of physically disabled 
persons—highlighting the need for accessibility in public spaces—and 
was also used to protest the legislative delays.35 A few months later, on 
July 26, 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed the Americans 
with Disabilities Act into law.36 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, the Supreme Court issued a 
number of decisions which limited and weakened the ADA.37 In 2008, 
though, Congress responded to these decisions by enacting the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act.38 The act rejected a num-
ber of the Supreme Court's decisions and ordered future courts to in-
terpret the ADA broadly.39 
3. Substantive provisions of the ADA 
The ADA prohibits employers with fifteen or more employees 
from discriminating in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment because of an individual's disability, record of such, or association 
with disabled persons.40 Disability is defined as a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activity.41 
 
 33.  See Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987); see also H.R. REP. NO. 
101-485, pt. 3, at 30, 53; S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 23. 
 34.  Meldon, supra note 23. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018)). The ADA passed 377 to 28 in the House, with 27 absten-
tions; it passed 91 to 6 in the Senate, with 3 abstentions. Colker, supra note 31, at 26. 
 37.  See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Albertson's, Inc. 
v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton 
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). These decisions are further discussed in Part 
II.B.3. 
 38.  Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 
Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018)). 
 39.  E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) ("The definition of disability in this chapter shall be 
construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the maximum extent 
permitted by the terms of this chapter."). 
 40.  Id. § 12102(1). The term "disability" also applies to those who are "regarded as" hav-
ing a substantially limiting physical or mental impairment. Id. 
 41.  Id. § 12102(1)(A). The ADA does not apply to LGBTQ-related conditions, sex be-
havior disorders, kleptomania, pyromania, compulsive gambling, or ongoing substance abuse. Id. 
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Major life activities, in turn, include caring for oneself, eating, sleep-
ing, breathing, seeing, and hearing; walking, standing, lifting, and 
bending; speaking and communicating; performing manual tasks and 
working; reading, thinking, concentrating, and learning; and certain 
bodily functions.42 
The ADA also requires employers to reasonably accommodate dis-
abled employees and job applicants.43 Such accommodations may in-
clude adapting employer facilities, providing parking or transit for dis-
abled employees and job applicants, and modifying duties, schedules, 
trainings, exams, and internal policies.44 Reasonable accommodations 
may also require providing readers or interpreters, reassigning an em-
ployee to a vacant position, or granting up to one year of unpaid 
leave.45 Though employers choose what accommodations to provide, 
courts nevertheless evaluate whether the employer has engaged with 
the employee in an "interactive process."46 
Employers that violate the ADA may be liable for backpay for up 
to two years, front pay, attorneys' fees, and compensatory and punitive 
damages.47 Courts may also choose to grant injunctive relief.48 Courts 
apply the same evidentiary standards under the ADA as they do for 
Title VII claims.49 A plaintiff must first make a prima facie case that he 
 
§ 12211. Impairment is assessed without considering the effects of any corrective measures, ex-
cept in the case of eyeglasses. Id. § 12102(4)(E). 
 42.  Id. § 12102(2). Impairments that substantially limit bodily functions may include con-
ditions like diabetes or cancer. 45 C.F.R. § 1153.103(1) (2018). But see Susan M. Gibson, The 
Americans with Disabilities Act Protects Individuals with a History of Cancer from Employment 
Discrimination: Myth or Reality?, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 167 (1998) (pre-ADAAA in-
quiry). 
 43.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5). 
 44.  Id. § 12111(9). 
 45.  Id.; Employer-Provided Leave and the Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (May 9, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/ada-
leave.cfm. Employers are generally not required to create a new position for an employee or to 
approve indefinite leave or permanent telework. See, e.g., Taylor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 196 F.3d 
1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1999) (indefinite leave); White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 362 (10th 
Cir. 1995) (creating a new position); Work at Home/Telework as a Reasonable Accommodation, 
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.eeoc.gov/facts/tele-
work.html (permanent telework). 
 46.  See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) (liability is 
appropriate where an employer fails to engage in the interactive process and a reasonable accom-
modation would have otherwise been possible), aff'd 535 U.S. 391, 407 (2002). 
 47.  Remedies for Employment Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM'N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/remedies.cfm (last visited Jan. 11, 2019, 8:04 AM). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  E.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003). 
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or she is disabled, is qualified for the position in question with or with-
out reasonable accommodation, has suffered a materially adverse em-
ployment action, and that this action occurred under circumstances 
giving rise to an inference of discrimination.50 The employer may then 
refute the plaintiff's case by articulating a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the employment decision, and the plaintiff may then 
show that the proffered reason is mere pretext and must persuade the 
factfinder of the unlawful discrimination's reality.51 
The ADA provides essentially two defenses to allegations of disa-
bility discrimination. First, employers may escape liability when a dis-
abled employee or job applicant poses a direct threat to health or 
safety.52 Second, employers may escape liability when they can prove 
their qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria are job-related 
and consistent with business necessity.53 Most customer preference de-
fenses fall into the latter category.54 
B. The Customer Preferences Problem 
Employers frequently discriminate against employees on the basis 
of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, and other 
untoward factors in order to cater to customer preferences.55 This is 
because customers are psychologically primed—and employers are 
economically motivated—to act on such preferences.56 Nonetheless, 
employers are forbidden from discriminating on these bases in making 
 
 50.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 51.  Id.; Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (ADEA plaintiffs must prove 
that age was the sole causal factor). In mixed-motive cases, Title VII plaintiffs must prove that 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a factor that led to an adverse employment action. 
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). At present, courts are divided on which standard applies to ADA 
plaintiffs. See also Derek Runyan, Confounding the Courts: The Circuit Courts' Failure to Ar-
ticulate an Appropriate Summary Judgement Standard in Mixed-Motive Individual Disparate 
Treatment Claims, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. 375, 386–96 (2017) (documenting the current circuit 
split). 
 52.  42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2018). This threat may be posed by the disabled person to 
themselves or others. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76 (2002) (up-
holding employer decision to withdraw job offer because of poor condition of applicant's liver, 
which could have been worsened by the position); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 
276 F.3d 1275, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (upholding adverse employment action against HIV-
infected dental hygienist because of danger of patient infection). 
 53.  42 U.S.C. § 12113(a). 
 54.  See infra Part I.C. 
 55.  See id. 
 56.  See infra Part I.B.1 and I.B.2. 
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employment decisions.57 Because Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA 
often conflict with customers' base inclinations and employers' eco-
nomic incentives, employers frequently attempt to circumvent antidis-
crimination law in order to cater to customer preferences. This is 
clearly seen with regard to disability discrimination.58 
1. The psychology of customer preferences 
The tendency for human beings to discriminate based on a desire 
to associate with people who are not disabled seems to be psychologi-
cally ingrained.59 Researchers have shown that human beings are most 
comfortable with others who look like themselves, who have had sim-
ilar experiences, and who share similar attitudes and personalities.60 
Likewise, human beings are predisposed to favor facial symmetry, av-
erageness, and familiarity.61 Many of these preferences are likely based 
on what psychologists call the "mere-exposure effect." This effect de-
scribes the phenomenon in which people tend to develop preferences 
for things that they are familiar with, simply because they are exposed 
to them more often.62 
 
 57.  E.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 
602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2018)) (proscribing discrimination on the basis of age); Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 
(2018)) (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. 
L. No. 95–555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2018)) (pregnancy); Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018)) (disability). 
 58.  See infra Part I.B.3. 
 59.  This sentiment is encapsulated by the well-known adage, "birds of a feather flock to-
gether." See, e.g., Kevin Woodson, Derivative Racial Discrimination, 12 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 
335, 342 (2016) (discussing the phrase and its history). 
 60.  See, e.g., Donn Byrne & William Griffitt, Interpersonal Attraction, 24 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL., 316 (1973) (individuals are attracted to those with similar attitudes); Wu Youyou et 
al., Birds of a Feather Do Flock Together: Behavior-Based Personality-Assessment Method Re-
veals Personality Similarity Among Couples and Friends, 28 PSYCHOL. SCI. 276, 276–77 (2017) 
(individuals are attracted to those with similar personalities); Berit Brogaard, Are We Attracted 
to People Who Look Like Us?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (May 13, 2015), https://www.psycholo-
gytoday.com/ us/blog/the-mysteries-love/201505/are-we-attracted-people-who-look-us (indi-
viduals are attracted to those with similar physical features). 
 61.  See, e.g., Anthony C. Little et al., Facial Attractiveness: Evolutionary Based Research, 
366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y 1638 (2011). 
 62.  See, e.g., Angela Y. Lee, The Mere Exposure Effect: Is It a Mere Case of Misattribu-
tion?, 21 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RESEARCH 270, 270-75 (Chris T. Allen & Deborah Roed-
der John eds., 1994) (describing the mere exposure effect with regard to product placement); 
Patricia Pliner, The Effects of Mere Exposure on Liking for Edible Substances, 3 APPETITE: J. 
FOR INTAKE RES. 283 (1982) (food); Leslie A. Zebrowitz, et al., Mere Exposure and Racial Prej-
udice: Exposure to Other-Race Faces Increases Liking for Strangers of that Race, 26 SOC. 
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These psychological underpinnings tend to result in customer dis-
crimination against disabled employees because most people do not 
have either actual or apparent disabilities, and so the characteristics, 
experiences, and personalities of disabled persons tend to be unfamiliar 
to customers generally.63 Likewise, some disabilities, such as the loss 
of a limb, disfiguring diseases, and certain types of autism, can result 
in bodily asymmetry.64 Disabilities in general are often evidenced by 
atypical physical and mental characteristics, and these characteristics 
are often met with fear and prejudice by the general population.65 
2. The economics of customer preferences 
Customers are free, of course, to choose not to patronize busi-
nesses because of their employees.66 Employers are not free, however, 
to discriminate against employees in order to cater to untoward cus-
tomer preferences.67 Because employers have strong economic incen-
tives to do so, they often discriminate against disfavored individuals in 
order to cater to untoward customer preferences.68 
 
COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 259 (2008) (race). 
 63.  See Matthew W. Brault, Americans with Disabilities: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 4 
(2012), https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2012/demo/p70-131.html (less than twenty 
percent of the population of the United States suffers from a disability). While many people may 
have disabled family members, friends, neighbors, etc., an even lesser percentage of Americans 
suffer from visible disabilities, and the symptoms of individual disabilities are wide-ranging. 
 64.  E.g., ADNP Syndrome, U.S. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE, 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/adnp-syndrome (last visited Jan. 9, 2019, 9:48 AM) (distinc-
tive facial features of ADNP, a type of autism). 
 65.  See, e.g., Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) ("[S]ociety's 
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical 
limitations that flow from actual impairment."); Jessica Scheer, They Act Like It's Contagious: A 
Study of Mobility Impairment in a New York City Neighborhood, in SOCIAL ASPECTS OF 
CHRONIC ILLNESS, IMPAIRMENT AND DISABILITY 62 (Stephen C. Hey et al. eds., 1984) (docu-
menting fears that disabled persons threaten the health and safety of others); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12113(e) (2018) (public concern surrounding HIV and AIDS); Carol L. Galletly & Steven D. 
Pinkerton, Toward Rational Criminal HIV Exposure Laws, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 327, 328–
35 (2004) (same). 
 66.  But see Katharine T. Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by Customers, 102 
IOWA L. REV. 223 (2016) (proposing that Congress extend civil rights laws to cover customer 
discrimination directly). 
 67.  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the 
basis of age); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (race, color, religion, sex, and national origin); id. § 12112 
(disability); see also Tamosaitis v. URS, Inc. 781 F.3d 468, 482 (9th Cir. 2015) ("[W]e have long 
held that a customer's discriminatory preference does not justify an employer's discriminatory 
practice."). 
 68.  See infra Part I.C. 
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In order to stay in business and turn a profit, businesses must at-
tract and retain customers; in order to attract and retain customers, 
businesses must satisfy customer demands. These demands are usually 
reasonable, such as expecting reliable, courteous, and responsive ser-
vice or preferring attractive corporate images, quality products, and 
low prices.69 But customer demands may also develop out of irrational 
fears and prejudices. Businesses often summarize the need to cater to 
customer preferences with sweeping phrases like "the customer is al-
ways right," "customer satisfaction is our highest priority," and "the 
customer is king."70 Such phrases have frequently been criticized by 
courts and commentators because they do not account for irrational 
fears and prejudices, but they are still pervasive in the business world.71 
Businesses are conditioned to cater to customer preferences in almost 
every regard, and it is naturally difficult for employers to divorce them-
selves from normal economic incentives in order to comply with legal 
mandates. As a result, customer psychology and economic reality 
prompt businesses to discriminate on the basis of disability and other 
unlawful factors. 
3. The reality of customer preferences 
Businesses discriminate on the basis of untoward customer prefer-
ences with disconcerting regularity. Fifty years of caselaw attests that 
attempts to raise customer preferences in defense to charges of dis-
crimination will not be going away, and that businesses are consistently 
 
 69.  See generally ART WEINSTEIN, SUPERIOR CUSTOMER VALUE: STRATEGIES FOR 
WINNING AND RETAINING CUSTOMERS (3d ed. 2012). 
 70.  Dallan F. Flake, When Should Employers Be Liable for Factoring Biased Customer 
Feedback into Employment Decisions?, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2169, 2174 n.15 (2018); Lea B. 
Vaughn, The Customer is Always Right. . . Not: Employer Liability for Third Party Sexual Har-
assment, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 13–14 (2002). Phrases like these are long-lived and still 
pervasive. See, e.g., Littleton v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC, 568 F.3d 641, 645 (8th Cir. 2009) (rea-
soning that the business principle of "the customer is always right" provided a legitimate reason 
to discipline an employee following a customer complaint); Charles T. LeViness, Caveat Emptor 
Versus Caveat Venditor, 7 MD. L. REV. 177, 178 (1943) (detailing the origins and history of the 
phrase "the customer is always right"). 
 71.  Some phrases may even be seen as inviting discrimination and harassment. See 
Vaughn, supra note 70, at n.45 (Kmart slogan "I'm here for you" viewed as inviting harassment); 
see also Callwood v. Dave & Buster's, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 694, 706 (D. Md. 2000) ("The days of 
'the customer is always right' [as a cognizable defense or justification] are long past."); Alicia A. 
Grandey et al., The Customer is Not Always Right: Customer Aggression and Emotion Regula-
tion of Service Employees, 25 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 397 (2004) (describing the idiom's 
contemporary prevalence).  
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ignorant or dismissive of antidiscrimination law on this point.72 In ad-
dition, customer preference defenses are beginning to evolve to cover 
discrimination by customers directly,73 as well as discrimination that is 
based on customer feedback74 and discrimination that is perpetuated 
by customers when they take the place of traditional supervisors or 
employers.75 
Customer preference discrimination on the basis of disability is no 
less prevalent than in the context of race, sex, age, or other character-
istics. Employers often justify discrimination against disabled employ-
ees by asserting that their quality of work is lower than what the cus-
tomer demands.76 Businesses also justify discrimination against 
disabled persons by alleging customer aversion to the appearance, 
mannerisms, or personalities of disabled employees.77 Some employers 
have even gone so far as to systematically record customer preferences 
 
 72.  See, e.g., EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 586–87 
(6th Cir. 2018) (funeral home attempting to argue that transgender employee would present a 
distraction that would obstruct the funeral home's ability to serve grieving families); Chaney v. 
Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 913–14 (7th Cir. 2010) (nursing home attempting to 
argue that its policy of acceding to patients' preferences for nurses of a certain race was reasona-
ble); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, SIGNIFICANT EEOC RACE/COLOR CASES, 
https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/initiatives/e-race/caselist.cfm?renderforprint=1#customer (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2019, 12:51 PM) (hospital attempting to argue that acceding to father's demand 
that no African-American nurses treat his newborn was reasonable; employer attempting to argue 
that its refusal to promote an employee was reasonable based on its belief that customers in "red-
neck country" would not accept an African-American account manager). Court cases are, of 
course, only a small percentage of actual customer preference-based discrimination. 
 73.  Juan M. Madera et al., Wait! What About Customer-Based Subtle Discrimination?, 
10 INDUS. & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 107, 107-10 (2017) (arguing that service industry 
employees are particularly vulnerable to direct discrimination from customers in the form of 
rudeness, lower tips, etc.); see also Lu-in Wang, When the Customer Is King: Employment Dis-
crimination as Customer Service, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 249, 250 (2016). 
 74.  Flake, supra note 70, at 2172–73 (discussing implicit bias and customer feedback 
mechanisms); Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, 
and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1416–17 (2009) 
(customer feedback mechanisms allow employers to "launder out" discriminatory intent). 
 75.  Alex Kirven, Comment, Whose Gig Is It Anyway: Technological Change, Workplace 
Control and Supervision, and Workers' Rights in the Gig Economy, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 249, 
285 (2018) (describing conventions at Uber and Lyft where customers rate drivers without 
higher-level review). 
 76.  See, e.g., Combes v. AIG Consultants, Inc., No. 95 C 1865, 1996 WL 596397 (N.D. 
Ill. Oct. 10, 1996) (finding that client's preference for service by a non-disabled employee was 
based on quality of work product). 
 77.  See, e.g., Chico Dairy Co. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75 (W.Va. 
1989) (alleging that woman missing an eye was not fit to be seen by vendors) (pre-ADA state law 
claim); Adam R. Pulver, An Imperfect Fit: Obesity, Public Health, and Disability Antidiscrimi-
nation Law, 41 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 365, 396–98 (2008) (discussing scholarship surround-
ing cases that have held that discrimination on the basis of customer aversion to obesity is per-
missible).  
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for nondisabled employees in order to more effectively screen disabled 
employees from contact with prejudiced customers.78 Because of the 
psychology and economics of customer preference, disability discrim-
ination by businesses is, and will likely continue to be, an unfortunate 
reality. 
C. Customer Preferences as a Defense to Discrimination 
In general, customer preferences are not a defense to discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or 
disability.79 There are essentially three exceptions, however. Courts 
have recognized customer preferences as a defense for issues that per-
tain to safety, privacy, and authenticity, respectively.80 These are the 
only exceptions under Title VII and the ADEA, and courts tend to be 
skeptical of customer preference defenses in such cases. In practice, 
however, many courts also recognize a fourth exception for ADA 
claims; namely, that some employees and job applicants are "unfit to 
be seen" by customers.81 This covert exception is essentially a refor-
mulation of the ugly laws of the late-1800s and should be expressly 
repudiated. 
1. Customer preferences under Title VII and the ADEA 
Before turning to the judiciary's treatment of customer preference 
in disability discrimination cases, it is helpful to consider how this de-
fense is treated in other contexts. Customer preferences are not gen-
erally a defense to claims under Title VII or the ADEA.82 Courts have 
applied this rule consistently to claims alleging discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, and age. 
 
 78.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Cornwell Pers. Assocs., Ltd., No. 95-C-854, 1995 WL 788208 
(E.D. Wis. Aug. 18, 1995) (business recording client preferences for employees of a particular 
disability status). 
 79.  See infra Part I.C.1. 
 80.  See infra Part I.C.2. 
 81.  Hodgdon v. Mount Mansfield Co., 624 A.2d 1122, 1132 (Vt. 1992); see infra Part 
I.C.3. 
 82.  See, e.g., Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1560 n.13 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The exist-
ence of . . . third party preferences for discrimination does not . . . justify discriminatory hiring 
practices."); Sparenberg v. Eagle All., No. JFM-14-1667, 2015 WL 6122809, at *6 (D. Md. Oct. 
15, 2015) ("An employer may not immunize its actions by ducking behind the preferences of a 
client."); Ames v. Cartier, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 762, 769 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("While pandering to 
customers' discriminatory preferences could very well help effectuate a sale, employers neverthe-
less 'may not discriminate on the basis of their customers' preferences.'") (citations omitted) 
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Race and color are not included in the section of Title VII that 
describes bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQs).83 This omis-
sion was likely deliberate,84 and courts have consistently held that cus-
tomer preferences cannot justify discrimination on the basis of race or 
color.85 To date, courts have only recognized two scenarios in which 
race may be a BFOQ—law enforcement operations and acting.86 
Non-religious employers are prohibited from discriminating on 
the basis of religion in employment, and discriminatory customer pref-
erences are not usually a defense.87 When an employee's need for ac-
commodation of a religious practice, observance, or good faith belief 
conflicts with customer preferences, however, courts have held that 
this imposes more than a de minimis burden on an employer and thus 
are willing to find undue hardship.88 Religious employers can discrim-
inate on the basis of religion in employment, including in positions 
that are non-religious.89 Religious employers may also discriminate on 
any basis in the hiring and employment of ministers and other clergy.90 
 
(quoting Wigginess, Inc., v. Fruchtman, 482 F. Supp. 681, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)). 
 83.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2018) ("[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of . . . religion, sex, or national 
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business . . . .") (em-
phasis added). 
 84.  See, e.g., Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 535 (5th Cir. 1980), reversed and 
remanded, 456 U.S. 273 (1982). 
 85.  See Knight v. Nassau Cty. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 649 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981). 
 86.  See Miller v. Tex. State Bd. of Barber Exam'rs, 615 F.2d 650, 654 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(acting); Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, 400 F.2d 294, 301 n.10 (5th Cir. 1968) (undercover 
infiltration of an all-black criminal organization); see also 110 Cong. Rec. 7213,7217 (1964) 
(comments of Senator Clifford Case on acting). 
 87.  See, e.g., Balk v. New York Inst. of Tech., 683 F. App'x 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 88.  See, e.g., Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 89.  E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d) (2018) (The ADA does not prohibit religious organizations 
"from giving preference in employment to individuals of a particular religion to perform work 
connected with the [organization]" or from requiring "that all applicants and employees conform 
to the religious tenets of [the] organization."); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (discussing the religious organi-
zation exception's application to non-religious activities); Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad., 450 
F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing the exception generally); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(a) 
(2018) (religious organizations nonetheless "may not discriminate against a qualified individual, 
who satisfies the permitted religious criteria, because of his or her disability."). 
 90.  See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 
171 (2012) (discussing this ministerial exception and interpreting "minister" broadly); see also 
Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999) (incorporating the ministerial exception into 
ADA caselaw), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 814 (2000). 
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The general rule against customer preference-based defenses de-
veloped primarily within the context of sex discrimination in the airline 
industry.91 This prohibition has since been extended to cover sex dis-
crimination in most other industries.92 Courts have, however, recog-
nized a narrow exception for cases involving sexual titillation.93 Cus-
tomer preference defenses that are proffered in response to allegations 
of national origin and age discrimination have likewise been found to 
be unpersuasive.94 
2. Safety, privacy, and authenticity exceptions 
Courts have essentially recognized three exceptions to the general 
rule against customer preference-based defenses. These exceptions are 
for customer preferences that bear upon safety, privacy, or authentic-
ity.95 
Concerns regarding the first exception, safety, must generally be 
well-founded and substantial. For example, courts have upheld a cus-
tomer preference-based defense where the threat of death was pre-
scribed by law.96 Courts have not upheld the defense in cases where the 
 
 91.  Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000) (striking down weight require-
ments which were proportionally skewed and imposed a greater burden on female flight attend-
ants), cert. denied 532 U.S. 914 (2001); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th 
Cir. 1971) ("[I]t would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices of 
the customers to determine whether the sex discrimination was valid."); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines 
Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (rejecting defendant's arguments that sex appeal was part 
of the essence of its business). 
 92.  See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1981) (em-
ployers cannot refuse to hire women based on customer preferences for men) (chemical manu-
facturer). 
 93.  See infra Part I.C.2. 
 94.  E.g., Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1560 n.13 (1994) ("The existence of such 
third party preferences for [national origin] discrimination does not, of course, justify discrimi-
natory hiring practices."); Silver v. N. Shore Univ. Hosp., 490 F. Supp. 2d 354, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (finding defendants' attempts to shift blame to others in an age discrimination suit to be 
unpersuasive); Ames v. Cartier, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 762, 768–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that 
a supervisor's remark that customers related better to people who looked like them was evidence 
of national origin discrimination). 
 95.  See, e.g., Michael J. Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News and Entertainment 
Industries: Does Title VII Need a Race or Color BFOQ?, 35 U.S.F.L. REV. 473, 484 (2001) 
(discussing these exceptions). Some courts recognize an exception for customer preferences that 
pertain to the "essence" of employers' businesses, but this is generally equivalent to the authen-
ticity exception. See, e.g., Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 299. 
 96.  Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (company refused 
to hire non-Muslim helicopter pilots for flights to Mecca because Saudi Arabian law made entry 
by non-Muslims punishable by beheading), aff'd, 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984). 
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threat was nebulous or hypothetical.97 In addition, courts have recog-
nized preferences that pertain to the safety of customers, as well as 
preferences that pertain to the safety of others.98 Safety-related age 
BFOQs have been upheld in various contexts, including for pilots, po-
lice officers, firefighters, bus drivers, and where certain physical re-
quirements are necessary for efficient job performance.99 
Concerns regarding the second exception, privacy, generally bear 
upon customer or third-party aversion to being seen without clothes 
by a member of the opposite sex.100 These concerns tend to arise in 
settings like hospitals, nursing homes, bathrooms, and prisons.101 In 
some instances, courts defer to such customer preferences in part be-
cause of the Constitution's protections for privacy.102 
Concerns regarding the last exception, authenticity, are often am-
biguous and have only been recognized in a limited number of circum-
stances. Customer preference-based discrimination is allowed in the 
 
 97.  See, e.g., Abrams v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 581 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Tex. 1984), aff'd 
in part, 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986) (feeble concern for the safety of Jewish staff members not a 
defense for excluding them from a program in Saudi Arabia). 
 98.  See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upholding a ban on females 
serving in "contact positions" at an all-male penitentiary because of concerns for order and be-
cause of the potential for assault); EEOC v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 710 F.2d 1091, 1097 
(5th Cir. 1983) (upholding university's practice of only hiring campus police officers under the 
age of forty-five because such officers were purportedly better able to deal with students). 
 99.  See, e.g., Correa-Ruiz v. Calderon-Serra, 411 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.P.R. 2005) (police 
officers). See generally Frank J. Cavico & Bahaudin G. Mujtaba, The Bona Fide Occupational 
Qualification (BFOQ) Defense in Employment Discrimination: A Narrow and Limited Justifi-
cation Exception, 7 J. BUS. STUD. Q. 15 (2016). 
 100.  See Healy v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996) (requiring 
at least one staff member of each gender to be available to patients at all times); Jones v. Hinds 
Gen. Hosp., 666 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (upholding practice of only allowing male nurses 
to administer catheters for male patients); EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. Civ. 80–1374–W, 
1982 WL 3108, at *5 (W.D. Okl. Feb. 02, 1982) ("intimate duties"). See generally Kimberly A. 
Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 
CALIF. L. REV. 147 (2004). 
 101.  Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding prison policy des-
ignating certain positions as female-only to preserve prisoner privacy); Norwood v. Dale Maint. 
Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (washroom attendants); Fesel v. Masonic Home of 
Del., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979) (upholding 
nursing home's refusal to hire male attendants given customer preference for females). But see 
Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F. 2d 1364, 1374 (11th Cir. 1982) (declining to uphold prison policy 
of refusing to hire females in order to preserve prisoner privacy). 
 102.  See Jones v. Henryville Corr. Facility, 220 F. Supp. 3d 923, 929 (S.D. Ind. 2016). 
WESTERGARD REVIEWED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2020  9:39 AM 
_vr=gçìêå~ä=çÑ=mìÄäáÅ=i~ï  [Vol. 34 
196 
case of actors and actresses,103 restaurants projecting an authentic at-
mosphere,104 and other comparable situations.105 Courts have at-
tempted to limit the authenticity exception to practices that pertain to 
a business's "essence,"106 though commentators have criticized this dis-
tinction since businesses often engage in many different enterprises 
and have multiple purposes.107 
3. Customer preferences under the ADA 
At first glance, customer preferences are not a defense to disability 
discrimination either.108 In reality, though, courts are often more will-
ing to recognize customer preferences for ADA claims than for claims 
under Title VII or the ADEA.109 This is particularly troubling in the 
context of the "unfit to be seen" exception. While many courts at least 
pay lip service to the general rule against customer preference-based 
defenses, some essentially agree to reappropriate the ugly laws of the 
late-1800s for the use of modern employers.110 
For example, in one case, the Fourth Circuit upheld the discharge 
of a disabled salesperson in part because his epileptic seizures allegedly 
upset customers.111 There, an epileptic man worked for a shoe retailer 
 
 103.  29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (2018) ("[T]he following situations do not warrant the applica-
tion of the bona fide occupational qualification exception: . . . refusal to hire an individual because 
of the preferences of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers except . . . [w]here it is nec-
essary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, . . . e.g., an actor or actress."). 
 104.  Util. Workers Union v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (up-
holding Chinese restaurant's policy requiring workers to be of Chinese nationality). 
 105.  See, e.g., Cavico & Mujtaba, supra note 99, at 22–23 (discussing the Walt Disney 
Company's successful practice of hiring workers to match theme park cultural areas so as to pro-
vide visitors with authentic experiences). 
 106.  See, Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 107.  See, e.g., Yuracko, supra note 100, at 167. 
 108.  E.g., EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1039 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 109.  Michael D. Moberly, Perception or Reality: Some Reflections on the Interpretation 
of Disability Discrimination Statutes, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 345 n.52 (1996) ("[T]he 
[customer preference strain of the BFOQ] defense retains some vitality, both in the disability 
discrimination context and elsewhere."). But see, Mark. R. Bandsuch, Ten Troubles with Title 
VII and Trait Discrimination Plus One Simple Solution: A Totality of the Circumstances Frame-
work, 37 CAP. U.L. REV. 965, 1006 (2009) ("Congress and the courts seem to exhibit a bit more 
concern about the potential prejudices faced by disabled in appearance policies than by those 
encountered by the original protected classes in Title VII."). 
 110.  See C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d at 1039 ("At the outset, we acknowledge that an 
employer's accommodation of the discriminatory preferences of other employees, clients, or cus-
tomers could, under certain circumstances, expose the employer to liability for discrimination.") 
(finding for the employer). 
 111.  Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104 F.3d 683 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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for several years before being hired on full-time.112 The retailer was 
aware of the man's epilepsy, and the man requested accommodation in 
the form of tolerance for his periodic fainting spells.113 The retailer 
admitted that the man was reliable, fully capable of performing his job, 
and a good salesperson—and that his seizures did not cause the store 
to lose customers.114 Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit upheld the dis-
charge, which was motivated by concerns that the man's seizures could 
have theoretically caused the retailer to lose customers.115 
In another instance, a federal district court declined to inquire into 
the true motives behind a client's preference for service from a non-
disabled employee.116 Instead, the court decided that the preference 
must have been based solely on the quality of the employee's work 
product.117 In another, the federal district court disregarded evidence 
of coworker comments complaining about the workload they were 
forced to shoulder in order to facilitate accommodations for a disabled 
worker.118 
In yet another case, a federal district court upheld the suspension 
and constructive discharge of a disabled doorman.119 The adverse em-
ployment actions occurred directly after customer complaints about 
the doorman's body odor and bad breath, both of which were possible 
symptoms of his disability.120 The court, however, chose to view these 
symptoms as independent of the disability.121 This lack of analysis is 
typical. Instead of addressing the customer preference issue directly, 




 112.  Id. at 685. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  See EEOC v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 917 F. Supp. 419, 427 n.5 (W.D. Va. 1996) (citing 
deposition testimony which expressed concern that the seizures impacted customers), aff'd 104 
F.3d 683 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 116.  Combes v. AIG Consultants, Inc., No. 95 C 1865, 1996 WL 596397 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 
10, 1996). 
 117.  See id. 
 118.  See Kazmierski v. Bonafide Safe & Lock, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 3d 838, 847 (E.D. Wis. 
2016); see also EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1039 (10th Cir. 2011) (disregarding 
evidence that an employer discouraged coworkers from working with plaintiff-employee by mak-
ing them sign a form acknowledging the employee's HIV-positive status). 
 119.  Seeman v. Gracie Gardens Owners Corp., 794 F. Supp. 2d 476, 479–80 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
 120.  Id. at 478–79. 
 121.  Id. at 480–83. 
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Courts addressing state law claims have been more explicit in their 
acceptance of discriminatory customer preferences. In one instance, 
the West Virginia Supreme Court denied the disability discrimination 
claim of a grocery store assistant manager who was missing an eye.122 
The individual was denied a promotion because of her "deformed" 
physical appearance.123 The West Virginia Supreme Court gave cre-
dence to the employer's concerns that the employee's artificial eye 
would not be something a vendor or customer "would like to encoun-
ter."124 
In another particularly callous instance, the Vermont Supreme 
Court denied a worker's disability claim in order to defer to customer 
preferences.125 There, a disabled woman who was missing her upper 
teeth worked as a chambermaid at a ski resort.126 The woman was ter-
minated because the ski resort believed she was "unfit to be seen by 
customers."127 The state supreme court endorsed the employer's view 
that "a particular physical condition [may be] a bona fide occupational 
qualification for [a] particular job," even where the condition is related 
to disability.128 
These federal and state cases illustrate two principles which char-
acterize many courts' attitudes toward disability discrimination. The 
first is general disregard. Courts are often too willing to look the other 
way when discrimination motivated by customer preferences rears its 
head. Many cases that clearly implicate untoward customer prefer-
ences lack analysis on the subject, and courts too often discount evi-
dence that would otherwise support allegations of disability discrimi-
nation. 
The second principle illustrated by these cases is that courts are 
often unduly sympathetic to the position of employers. Many courts 
disregard discrimination's effects on disabled employees in order to 
focus on business "necessities." These courts focus on finding that an 
employer had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse 
employment action, on the disabled employee's inability to perform 
the essential job functions of the position, and on how the symptoms 
 
 122.  Chico Dairy Co. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75, 77 (W.Va. 1989). 
It should also be noted that this case was decided shortly before the ADA was enacted. See id. 
 123.  Id. at 77–78. 
 124.  Id. at 78. 
 125.  Hodgdon v. Mount Mansfield Co., 624 A.2d 1122 (Vt. 1992). 
 126.  Id. at 1124. 
 127.  Id. at 1132. 
 128.  Id. 
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of the disability render the individual "unfit," rather than on the un-
derlying discrimination.129 Thus, a certain subset of courts essentially 
recognize an unsavory exception to the general rule against customer 
preference-based defenses when disabled employees are deemed "unfit 
to be seen."130 
ffK=^å~äóëáë=çÑ=íÜÉ=^a^=~åÇ=`ìëíçãÉê=mêÉÑÉêÉåÅÉë=
The "unfit to be seen" exception, which tacitly recognizes cus-
tomer aversion to disabled workers as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for adverse employment decisions, is not contemplated by the 
ADA. The exception is contrary to the ordinary meaning of the statute, 
and sublimating customer preferences probably qualifies as a reasona-
ble accommodation. The exception is also contradicted by the broad 
remedial purpose of the ADA, as seen in the act's legislative history 
and express allocation of costs. The exception gives undue weight to 
the costs businesses bear in sublimating untoward customer prefer-
ences, and it is unfair to disabled workers. For these reasons, the "unfit 
to be seen" exception to the general rule against customer preference-
based defenses should be expressly rejected by Congress; in the alter-
native, courts should cease to recognize it. 
A. The Text of the ADA 
The text of the ADA does not directly address customer prefer-
ences. Nonetheless, it broadly proscribes disability discrimination, and 
it does not mention customer preferences alongside the act's other rec-
ognized defenses.131 The ADA also requires employers to reasonably 
accommodate disabled employees and job applicants, and this require-
ment likely encompasses the possibility of foregoing individual cus-
tomers because of a refusal to condone animus.132 Thus, the text of the 
 
 129.  In finding the symptoms of disability to be disqualifying, courts tend to overlook the 
realities of employment discrimination. Few employers discriminate against disabled persons be-
cause they are classed as disabled. Instead, employers discriminate because they find the symp-
toms of disability to be disadvantageous. Discrimination on the basis of the symptoms of disability 
is disability discrimination. 
 130.  Hodgdon, 624 A.2d at 1132. 
 131.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 132.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
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ADA likely prohibits most customer preference-based defenses to dis-
crimination, and it certainly prohibits the "unfit to be seen" variety of 
the defense. 
1. "No covered entity shall discriminate." 
The ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate 
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability [with regard to 
the] terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."133 This broad 
prohibition against disability discrimination must be the backdrop for 
any analysis of whether the ADA contemplates customer preference-
based defenses.134 In general, all affirmative defenses are an exception 
to the usual rule against disability discrimination, and the defendant 
bears the burden of proof.135 Unlike Title VII, the ADA provides some 
clarification as to the meaning of "discriminate," namely that it in-
cludes limiting an employee or job applicant in any way that adversely 
affects his or her employment opportunities or status.136 This likely 
applies to situations where an employer "limits" a disabled employee 
by prohibiting him or her from having contact with a customer or 
other third party,137 which could affect employment opportunities like 
commissions, bonuses, promotions, training, experience, etc. The 
ADA also states that discrimination includes utilizing standards, crite-
ria, or methods of administration that effectuate disability discrimina-
tion or that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to 
the employer's administrative control.138 While customers may not be 
 
 133.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2018). 
 134.  The first step in statutory interpretation is to find the ordinary meaning of a statute's 
language. E.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); W. Va. Univ. 
Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98–99 (1991); Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 
U.S. 552, 552 (1990); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). 
 135.  Auto. Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 221-22 (1991) ("The burden 
of proving that a discriminatory qualification is a BFOQ . . . rests with the employer.") (citing 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 248 (1989) and Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 
321, 333 (1977)). 
 136.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1). 
 137.  See, e.g., Chico Dairy Co. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75, 77–78 
(W.Va. 1989) (employer viewing contact with vendors as undesirable). 
 138.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) ("[T]he term 'discriminate . . . ' [includes] utilizing standards, 
criteria or methods of administration . . . that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are 
subject to common administrative control."). 
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subject to the employer's "administrative" control, employers do exer-
cise some control over their clientele and this principle may reasonably 
be extended to the customer preference defense.139 
The ADA's purpose section sheds further light on when customer 
preference defenses are allowable.140 First, the act finds that "physical 
or mental disabilities in no way diminish a person's right to fully par-
ticipate in all aspects of society."141 The right to full participation in 
society likely includes the right to be free from discrimination based 
on an employer's desire to cater to customer preferences. In addition, 
Congress stated that the goal of the ADA is "to assure equality of op-
portunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency" for disabled individuals.142 This goal is largely thwarted 
when courts allow customer preference-based defenses, particularly 
those of the "unfit to be seen" variety. 
The ADA does not expressly provide for a customer preference 
BFOQ defense.143 Instead, the ADA allows the defendant to raise an 
affirmative defense either when a disabled employee or job applicant 
poses a direct threat to the health or safety of themselves or others, or 
when the employer uses criteria that are "job-related and consistent 
with business necessity" and performance cannot be accomplished 
with reasonable accommodation.144 Customer preferences that pertain 
to significant health or safety risks are clearly codified as a defense un-
der the ADA.145 The second situation is essentially a reformulation of 
Title VII's BFOQ and business necessity defenses.146 It is this defense 
 
 139. See Folkerson v. Circus Enters., Inc., 107 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1997) (employer liable 
for harassment by patron if it knew or should have known of the harassment and took insufficient 
remedial action). This provision of the statute clearly applies to coworker preferences. Cf. 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3). 
 140.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12101; see also Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484–86 
(1999) (citing ADA's legislative findings); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588–90 (1981) 
(consulting statute's findings and purpose section); Knebel v. Hein, 429 U.S. 288, 292 n.9 (1977) 
(consulting statute's declaration of policy section). 
 141.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1). 
 142.  Id. § 12101(a)(7). 
 143.  See id. § 12113.  
 144.  Id. § 12113(a). 
 145.  See generally Lawrence O. Gostin, The Americans With Disabilities Act and the 
Corpus of Anti-Discrimination Law: A Force for Change in the Future of Public Health Regu-
lation, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 89, 113–20 (1993) (discussing what risks are "significant"). 
 146.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a); cf. id. § 2000e-2(e), (k); see also Morton v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., 272 F.3d 1249, 1261–63 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing the defenses available under the 
ADA). But see Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 995–96 (9th Cir. 2007) (overrul-
ing Morton, but doing so in part because the ADA's business necessity defense also necessitates 
reasonable accommodation and noting that the defense still applies to disparate treatment 
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that arguably covers the rest of the customer preference-based de-
fenses.147 The ADA's business necessity defense is couched in qualify-
ing language, however,148 and the Supreme Court has stated that this 
type of affirmative defense "provides only the narrowest of exceptions 
to the general rule requiring equality of employment opportunities."149 
It is debatable whether customer preferences are reasonably job-re-
lated since they are often based on psychologically engrained, but un-
founded fears and prejudices rather than concerns that are rational or 
proven.150 And though customer preferences might at least theoreti-
cally constitute business necessity, most of the time the ADA's reason-
able accommodation provisions require their sublimation.151 The text 
of the ADA thus mitigates against allowing the "unfit to be seen" vari-
ety of the customer preference defense. 
2. Reasonable accommodation 
The ADA requires employers to reasonably accommodate disabled 
employees and job applicants unless the accommodation would result 
in undue hardship.152 Sublimating customer preferences, particularly 
preferences for avoiding interactions with disabled employees, is likely 
a reasonable accommodation. Most reasonable accommodations re-
quire employers to incur some sort of expense, whether it be paying 
other employees to modify trainings or exams, providing readers or 
interpreters, adapting facilities to increase accessibility, or something 
else.153 Requiring employers to forgo the business of certain customers 
imposes similar costs.154 On the other hand, however, these costs are 
 
claims). 
 147.  If this were not so, the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius would dictate 
that customer preference defenses do not apply to disability discrimination in any form. See gen-
erally Stephen M. Durden, Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules or Predilective Tools, 33 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 115, 130–37 (2010). 
 148.  42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (showing that criteria are job-related and consistent with busi-
ness necessity "may be a defense to a charge of discrimination") (emphasis added). 
 149.  Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977). 
 150.  See supra Part I.A.1. 
 151.  See supra Part II.A.2.  
 152.  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (2018). This is true regardless of 
whether the employer raises an affirmative defense. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a). 
 153.  See, e.g., J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 903 (2003) (dis-
cussing the costs of accommodation and the ADA generally). 
 154.  Most costs associated with reasonable accommodations are minor. Andrew Houten-
ville & Valentini Kalargyrou, People with Disabilities: Employers' Perspectives on Recruitment 
Practices, Strategies, and Challenges in Leisure and Hospitality, 53 CORNELL HOSPITALITY Q. 
40, 42 (2011) (noting that over seventy percent of accommodations in the hospitality industry 
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of a different nature from the usual costs of accommodation since they 
may be indeterminate and are not undertaken affirmatively.155 But be-
cause all major businesses must comply with the ADA, these costs are 
borne by all employers alike, lessening any individualized burden. Cus-
tomers that opt to "take their business elsewhere" may very well be 
forced to return to original, nondiscriminatory businesses after finding 
that their untoward tastes are not tolerated anywhere. In any case, 
these costs are precisely the kind which the ADA allocates to employ-
ers. 
Accommodations requiring employers to sublimate customer pref-
erences would not usually impose undue hardship on employers, ei-
ther. For an employer to show hardship under the ADA, it must incur 
"significant difficulty or expense."156 In evaluating whether an accom-
modation imposes undue hardship on an employer, the ADA allows 
for consideration of the nature and cost of the accommodation; the 
resources and number of employees of the facility in question; the re-
sources and number of employees of the business as a whole; and the 
organizational, geographic, and fiscal relationships of the facility to the 
business.157 Thus, the only time that sublimating customer preferences 
would be likely to impose undue hardship on an employer is when the 
costs are substantial when compared to the employer's size.158 Scenar-
ios where small, modern-day employers are driven to the verge of 
bankruptcy after employing disabled persons solely because of unto-
 
cost less than five hundred dollars and twenty percent cost nothing). 
 155.  In this regard, these costs may be comparable to requested accommodations for in-
definite leave. See, e.g., Taylor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 196 F.3d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1999); U.S. 
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: APPLYING 
PERFORMANCE AND CONDUCT STANDARDS TO EMPLOYEES WITH DISABILITIES (Dec. 20, 
2017), https://www.eeoc.gov/facts/performance-conduct.html#fn77 ("[G]ranting indefinite 
leave . . . can impose an undue hardship on an employer's operations."). 
 156.  42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). 
 157.  See id. § 12111(10)(B); see also Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and 
Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1124 (2010) ("The duty to accommodate is a substantial 
obligation, . . . one that is not subject to a cost-benefit balance but instead to a cost-resource 
balance . . . ; it is also . . . liable to increase over time."); Julie Brandfield, Undue Hardship: Title 
I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 113, 127 (1990) ("[P]rofitability 
and morale are at the essence of the four statutory factors."). 
 158.  Lisa A. Lavelle, The Duty to Accommodate: Will Title I of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act Emancipate Individuals with Disabilities Only to Disable Small Businesses?, 66 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1135 (1991) (discussing the ADA's impact on small businesses); Weber, 
supra note 157, at 1150–51 (reasonable accommodation may require significant effort and costs, 
can be expensive, and need not accrue to the benefit of an employer). 
WESTERGARD REVIEWED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2020  9:39 AM 
_vr=gçìêå~ä=çÑ=mìÄäáÅ=i~ï  [Vol. 34 
204 
ward customer preferences are more at home in academic hypotheti-
cals than in the real world, however.159 As such, it is probably reasona-
ble to expect employers to sublimate customer preferences in order to 
accommodate disabled employees. On the whole, the text of the ADA 
mitigates against allowing employers to discriminate against disabled 
persons in order to pander to discriminatory customer preferences. 
B. The Legislative History of the ADA 
Where the text of a statute is not dispositive, courts often consult 
legislative history to aid in statutory construction.160 The text of the 
ADA indicates that the act proscribes disability discrimination based 
on untoward customer preferences, and this reading is confirmed by 
the statute's legislative history. This history shows that the ADA was 
meant to have a broad remedial purpose,161 that Congress was aware of 
the costs the act would impose on employers, and that it did not intend 
courts to give undue weight to customer preference-based defenses.162 
Again, this is particularly true with respect to the "unfit to be seen" 
variety of the customer preference defense. 
1. The broad remedial purpose of the ADA 
In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA in order to combat discrimi-
nation against persons with disabilities;163 therefore, the broad reme-
dial purpose of the ADA likely includes disallowing most customer 
preference-based defenses. The statute expressly describes its purpose 
as, 
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; 
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards ad-
dressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities; 
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in 
 
 159.  See Lavelle, supra note 158, at 1186 n.283 (discussing the original draft of the ADA's 
"bankruptcy" exception). 
 160.  See, e.g., Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010). The text here is likely disposi-
tive, but since the legislative history confirms this reading it may still be informative. 
 161.  See discussion infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.3. 
 162.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 163.  See supra Part I.A; see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 9 (1989) (statement of President 
George H. W. Bush) ("[S]tatistics consistently demonstrate that disabled people are the poor-
est . . . and largest minority in America."). 
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enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of indi-
viduals with disabilities; and 
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority . . . in order to 
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people 
with disabilities.164This statement indicates that the act's broad reme-
dial purpose includes curtailing individual preferences for discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability.165 
The ADA's broad antidiscrimination mandate was well understood 
by both proponents and opponents of the act, and the legislative record 
is rife with statements which show the legislature's broad intentions.166 
The legislative history of the act also indicates that part of its purpose 
was to help integrate disabled persons "into the economic and social 
mainstream of American life,"167 and that this included limiting dis-
crimination on the basis of customer preferences.168 
Congress first took up the subject of disability discrimination in 
response to the HIV and AIDS crises which were then particularly 
prominent issues of public concern.169 As part of the debate surround-
ing these topics, Representative Jim Chapman proposed an amend-
ment to the ADA in order to permit employers to bar employees with 
communicable diseases from food handling positions.170 Congress, 
however, rejected the idea that customer preferences or phobias may 
be a defense to discrimination.171 
 
 164.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2018). 
 165.  Since Congress cannot regulate customer preferences directly, it does so indirectly 
through businesses. See Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 66, at 227 ("[T]he regulation of firms alone 
is sufficient to achieve society's nondiscrimination goals."). 
 166.  See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. 19,810 (1989) (statement of Sen. David Durenberger) 
("[T]he basic principle of this legislation [is] to provide a clear and comprehensive prohibition 
against discrimination against persons with disabilities."); id. at 19, 803 (remarks of Sen. Orrin 
Hatch) (the ADA's objective was to establish a clear, comprehensive prohibition against disability 
discrimination); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 20 (1989) (discussing the act's broad remedial purpose); 
Colker, supra note 31, at 26 ("[B]oth the proponents and opponents of the ADA understood the 
definition of disability to have a very broad scope."). 
 167.  H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 23 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 
446. 
 168.  Id. at 30. 
 169.  Colker, supra note 31, at 2, 6 (describing Congress's "overwhelming commitment to 
cover individuals with HIV infection"); see also 135 CONG. REC. 22,734 (1989) (statement of 
Rep. Dan Burton displaying homophobia in opposition to the legislation). 
 170.  Colker, supra note 31, at 21. 
 171.  See Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 493–94 (1991) (discussing Chapman's proposed amend-
ment in relation to Congress's rejection of customer preference defenses). 
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2. The costs of the ADA and undue hardship 
The costs incurred by employers in failing to cater to discrimina-
tory customer preferences likely do not rise to the level of undue hard-
ship, for several reasons.172 First, the legislative history of the ADA 
shows that Congress was well aware of the costs the act would impose 
on employers.173 For instance, despite extensive consideration of an 
amendment first proposed by Senator Orrin Hatch, Congress chose 
not to allow small businesses a tax credit in accordance with their ef-
forts to accommodate disabled employees.174 Second, the legislative 
history indicates that costs must be significant in order to constitute 
undue hardship under the ADA.175 For instance, the House rejected an 
amendment that would have imposed a presumption of undue hard-
ship when the costs of accommodation exceeded ten percent of the 
disabled employee's annual salary or wages—a threshold that would be 
difficult to meet in many scenarios.176 Third, the legislative history in-
dicates that Congress was reticent to allow employers to discriminate 
against disabled workers even when the employer would suffer undue 
hardship.177 
Congress also used language similar to that found in Title VII and 
was presumptively cognizant of Title VII's lack of a general customer 
preference defense.178 In addition, arguments that customers might re-
fuse to patronize restaurants that employed persons with disabilities 
 
 172.  See supra Part II.A.2. 
 173.  See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. 19,881–82 (1989) (statement of Sen. Gordon Humphrey 
opposing the act's "monumental" costs). 
 174.  See Colker, supra note 31, at 20–22. 
 175.  135 CONG. REC. 19,872. 
 176.  See 136 CONG. REC. 10,903–09 (1990). 
 177.  See S. 2345, at § 3(5) (1988) (enacted) (defining reasonable accommodation without 
providing an undue hardship exception). But see Colker, supra note 31, at 10–11 (describing the 
reservations of multiple senators with regard to the exclusion of an undue hardship exception). 
Of course, the failure of Congress to enact this bill and the eventual inclusion of an undue hard-
ship exception may easily mitigate the other way. Here, any reliance on legislative history would 
encounter the oft-cited criticism that doing so is akin to looking over a crowd and picking out 
one's friends. E.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 178.  136 CONG. REC. 10,856 (statement of Rep. Steny Hoyer) ("Whenever possible, we 
have used terms of art from the 1964 Civil Rights Act and from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
phrases already interpreted in courts throughout this land so that business can know exactly what 
we mean."); see also H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 16 (2008). When Congress uses words or 
concepts with meanings established elsewhere, courts presume their meanings are the same. See, 
e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–24 (1992); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 
U.S. 478, 484 (1990); United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 
(1988). This presumption is stronger when statutes contain similar subject matter. See, e.g., 
Sorenson v. Sec'y of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986). 
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were met with fierce opposition and repeatedly characterized as pro-
moting fear and prejudice.179 Congress was aware of the costs busi-
nesses would incur in order to comply with the ADA, and it did not 
believe that these costs generally rose to the level of undue hardship. 
3. The broad remedial purpose of the ADAAA 
The ADAAA's reaffirmation of the broad prohibition against dis-
ability discrimination further mitigates against most forms of the cus-
tomer preference defense. After the ADA was passed in 1990, the Su-
preme Court issued a number of decisions which severely limited its 
scope. For instance, the Court required substantial limitation to be 
proven after corrective measures were taken,180 and it held that "mere 
difference" between an individual's ability to perform a major life ac-
tivity and an average person's ability to do so was not a substantial lim-
itation.181 The Court questioned whether working was a major life ac-
tivity,182 and it strengthened language surrounding substantial 
impairments and major life activities.183 As a result, the ADA of the 
1990s and early-2000s was a largely ineffective statute.184 
In 2008, Congress reemphasized the broad scope of the ADA by 
passing the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act.185 Con-
gress passed this act largely in response to the Supreme Court's nar-
rowing decisions, stating amongst other things that the standards im-
posed by the Court "created an inappropriately high level of limitation 
necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA."186 Congress specifically 
 
 179.  136 CONG. REC. 10,913 (statements of Rep. Henry Waxman and Rep. Steve Bartlett). 
 180.  Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488 (1999). 
 181.  Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999). 
 182.  Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 523 (1999). 
 183.  Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). These decisions 
relied on the EEOC's regulations. See, e.g., Kate S. Arduini, Note, Why the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Amendments Act is Destined to Fail: Lack of Protection for the "Truly" Disa-
bled, Impracticability of Employer Compliance, and the Negative Impact It Will Have on Our 
Already Struggling Economy, 2 DREXEL L. REV. 161, 169–71 (2009). 
 184.  See, e.g., Thomas DeLeire, The Unintended Consequences of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 23 REG. 21, 21 (2000) ("[S]tudies of the consequences of the employment pro-
visions of the ADA show that the Act has led to less employment of disabled workers."). 
 185.  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 705 and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2018)). 
 186.  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(a)(8), (b)(5), 122 Stat. 3553, 
3554; see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, § (2)(b)(3), 122 Stat. 3553, 
3554 (overturning the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the "regarded as" prong). 
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rewrote the statute to require that the definition of disability be con-
strued broadly.187 As a result, any attempt to raise customer preferences 
as a defense to discrimination must be read in this light. Customer 
preferences will seldom justify businesses flouting the broad remedial 
purpose of the ADA since Congress has clearly indicated that the costs 
of accommodating disabled workers are to be borne by employers. 
C. The Policies of the ADA 
In enacting the ADA, Congress essentially balanced two policies—
the costs employers incur in avoiding disability discrimination and the 
unfairness of discrimination faced by disabled persons—and chose to 
prioritize the latter.188 The costs of sublimating customer preferences 
are usually minor and are often offset by positive externalities resulting 
from diversity and inclusion.189 In part because disabilities are substan-
tially similar to immutable characteristics covered by Title VII and the 
ADEA, it is unfair to allow employment discrimination against disa-
bled persons simply because of the irrational tastes of an employer's 
customers.190 Congress's legislative choices are entitled to deference, 
and the judiciary's tolerance for the "unfit to be seen" customer pref-
erence exception usurps the legislature's role as policy maker.191 
1. Costs of sublimating customer preferences 
Disallowing customer preference-based discrimination imposes 
some costs on businesses in the form of compliance and lost custom-
ers.192 The ADA also imposes the costs of governmental enforcement 
 
 187.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2018). 
 188.  See discussion infra Part II.C.1. 
 189.  See discussion infra Part II.C.2; see also Craig Westergard, Note, You Catch More 
Flies with Honey: Reevaluating the Erroneous Premises of the Military Exception to Title VII, 
20 MARQ. BEN. & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 215, 248-49 (2019) (citing sources). 
 190.  See discussion infra Part II.C.3. 
 191.  E.g., Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 138 (1985) 
(stating that courts should defer to Congress when the legislature makes policy choices that in-
volve weighing competing goals). 
 192.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 480–94 (1992) (the ADA costs businesses sales and cus-
tomers when it disallows discrimination based on customer preferences); Peter David Blanck, 
The Economics of the Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act Part I: 
Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 898–909 (1997) (discussing the costs im-
posed by the ADA). 
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on all taxpaying entities.193 In the aggregate, however, these costs are 
insubstantial. Most rational consumers do not walk away from the low-
est price or the highest quality product just because of an irrational 
aversion to the employment of disabled persons.194 Instead, their ra-
tional desire to maximize utility prevails over any irrational prejudice 
against disabled persons.195 In addition, the costs of the ADA's bar 
against customer preference-based discrimination will decrease over 
time as previously prejudiced customers are exposed to persons with 
disabilities and their irrational beliefs begin to fade.196 
The costs of accommodation are also slight. Disabled persons can, 
with reasonable accommodation, perform essential job functions just 
as effectively as other individuals.197 The only real exception to this 
truism is when customer preferences for nondisabled employees are 
based on concerns for health or safety, which the text of the ADA al-
ready addresses.198 The inherent costs of accommodation tend to be 
either low or nonexistent.199 In any case, it is the prerogative of the 
 
 193.  See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 10-116, at 90–94 (1989) (discussing costs the ADA would im-
pose on federal, state, and local governments). 
 194.  See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 496 (1992) 
(consumers are usually rational); Monroe Peter Friedman, Quality and Price Considerations in 
Rational Consumer Decision Making, 1 J. CONSUMER AFF. 13, 13 (1967) (rational consumers 
tend to account for price and quality). 
 195.  See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 520–21 (1980); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal 
Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 (1979). While it may be rational for businesses to give heed 
to customer preferences, this only reinforces irrational prejudices. Cass Sunstein, Three Civil 
Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REV. 751, 760 (1991) (economically rational discrimination tends to 
reinforce prejudice). 
 196.  Jessica Walker & Katrina Scior, Tackling Stigma Associated with Intellectual Disa-
bility Among the General Public: A Study of Two Indirect Contact Interventions, 34 RES. IN 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 2200, 2201 (2013) (repeated exposure decreases stigma). 
 197.  See Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
35 GA. L. REV. 27, 86 (2000). As such, customer preferences for nondisabled persons are almost 
always irrational. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 
833, 848 (2001) (consumer discrimination on the basis of race or sex is irrational); Larry Alexan-
der, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Prox-
ies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 169–70 (1992) (discussing erroneous beliefs and irrationality). 
 198.  42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2018). Such concerns must still be legitimate, of course. A cus-
tomer's irrational belief that cancer is contagious, or that diabetes precludes occupation as a 
teacher or a doctor would not implicate this defense. Compare Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 
F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984), with Abrams v. Baylor Coll. 
of Med., 581 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Tex. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 805 F.2d 528 (5th 
Cir. 1986). 
 199.  Blanck, supra note 192, at 903 ("[D]irect costs of the accommodations for any partic-
ular disability tend to be low, [and] many companies regularly make informal and undocumented 
accommodations that require minor and cost-free workplace adjustments that are implemented 
directly by an employee and [a] supervisor."); see also Kuehl v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 909 F. 
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legislature to impose these costs on businesses,200 and to impose utility 
costs on customers.201 Congress has found that disability discrimina-
tion itself "costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary 
expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity."202 The 
costs of such dependency and nonproductivity likely outweigh any 
costs associated with disability antidiscrimination laws. 
2. Benefits of sublimating customer preferences 
The benefits that accrue as discrimination decreases and inclusivity 
increases are well documented. One of the primary benefits of de-
creased discrimination against disabled persons is that worker produc-
tivity increases.203 Worker morale and motivation improve when in-
clusivity increases,204 and diversity also helps increase creativity and 
innovation in the workplace and results in a more positive public im-
age.205 
Accommodating disabled workers can also lead to increased busi-
ness.206 For example, Representative Amo Houghton of New York told 
of a restaurant in his district that, to comply with state law, "was forced 
to install an elevator to take disabled patrons to one of the three floors 
 
Supp. 794, 798 (D. Colo. 1995) (store greeter periodically sitting on stool while at work). 
 200.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (commerce clause). The commerce power is extremely broad 
and allows Congress to regulate virtually all aspects of American business and society. See, e.g., 
Diane McGimsey, The Commerce Clause and Federalism after Lopez and Morrison: The Case 
for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1675, 1685–99 (2002). But 
see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387 
(1987). 
 201.  See Kelman, supra note 197, at 848 ("The customer will bear only psychic 
losses . . . ."). 
 202.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2018). 
 203.  Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable 
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 23 (1996) (accommodating disabled workers increases worker 
productivity); see also Blanck, supra note 192, at 904 (accommodating disabled workers allows 
qualified workers to stay in the work force and reduces absenteeism). 
 204.  See, e.g., Jennifer A. Brooke & Tom R. Tyler, Diversity and Corporate Performance: 
A Review of the Psychological Literature, 89 N.C. L. REV. 715, 723 (2011); Swinton W. Hudson, 
Jr., Diversity in the Workforce, 3 J. EDUC. & HUM. DEV. 73, 80 (2014); M.V. Lee Badgett et al., 
The Business Impact of LGBT-Supportive Workplace Policies, WILLIAMS INST. (2013), 
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Business-Impact-of-LGBT-Policies-
May-2013.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2019). 
 205.  See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 204; Brooke & Tyler, supra note 204; Karen A. Jehn, 
Managing Workteam Diversity, Conflict, and Productivity: A New Form of Organizing in the 
Twenty-First Century Workplace, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 473 (1998). 
 206.  See, e.g., Blanck, supra note 192, at 879 n.130 (noting that hiring, working with, and 
accommodating disabled persons increases available customer pools, employee morale, profita-
bility, creativity, and flexibility). 
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of the restaurant. The proprietor resisted the mandate but finally com-
plied. To his surprise, he found that his business increased because of 
his initiative. The move helped attract [disabled persons] to his restau-
rant."207 Because some accommodations increase accessibility for both 
workers and patrons alike, complying with antidiscrimination law may 
help businesses to increase their customer bases directly. But accom-
modating disabled persons also attracts customers indirectly by en-
hancing employers' images and creating other synergistic benefits.208 
When antidiscrimination laws are successful, these benefits succeed in 
offsetting many of the costs of compliance.209 
3. Fairness of sublimating customer preferences 
It is fair to both employers and disabled persons to disallow most 
types of customer preference defenses to discrimination. Employers 
have been on notice of the ADA's requirements since at least 1990.210 
The ADA was easily foreseeable after the enactment of the Rehabili-
tation Act in 1973,211 was phased in gradually,212 and was not fully en-
forced by the courts until after the ADAAA was passed in 2008.213 
While disabilities are not always immutable, the acquisition of a disa-
bility usually lacks scienter or fault, and so it is unfair to disabled per-
sons to allow employers to discriminate on the basis of a characteristic 
that cannot be changed.214 Disability discrimination contradicts funda-
mental moral precepts like doing good to all and the Golden Rule.215 
Fundamentally, discrimination in employment on the basis of disabil-
ity is irrational.216 It is based on unfounded fears and prejudices that 
 
 207.  136 CONG. REC. 10,875 (1990). 
 208.  See, e.g., Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 203, at 23. 
 209.  John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimi-
nation Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1601–02 (1992). 
 210.  See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (cod-
ified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018)). 
 211.  See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797 (2018)). 
 212.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). 
 213.  See Americans with Disabilities Amendment Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 
Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018)); see also supra Part I.A.2 
and Part II.B.1. 
 214.  See Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 
1213, 1238–39 (2003). 
 215.  See Neil Duxbury, Golden Rule Reasoning, Moral Judgment, and Law, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1529 (2009); Hunter v. Ward, 476 F. Supp. 913, 918 & n.3 (E.D. Ark. 1979). 
 216.  See supra Part II.C.I. 
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cannot be justified by the discriminatory preferences of an employer's 
customers.217 Because the costs of accommodating disabled workers 
tend to be low and are often offset by the benefits of increased diversity 
and inclusion, and because disability discrimination is fundamentally 
unfair, courts should only recognize defenses based on customer pref-
erences in limited circumstances. 
D. How Courts Should Treat Customer Preferences under the ADA 
Customer preference-based defenses under the ADA and other an-
tidiscrimination statutes should receive similar treatment.218 This Note 
proposes the following with regard to customer preference defenses 
under the ADA: first, that preferences pertaining to safety generally be 
considered a defense; second, that preferences pertaining to privacy 
not be considered a defense; third, that preferences pertaining to au-
thenticity be considered a defense only within the context of acting and 
only when the disability is reasonably apparent and negatively affects 
audiences; and fourth, that the "unfit to be seen" strain of the customer 
preference defense be expressly repudiated.219 
Customer preferences that pertain to health or safety are expressly 
recognized by the ADA, and so are permissible.220 Customer prefer-
ences that pertain to privacy usually only arise in the context of sex 
discrimination, and there is no compelling reason to extend this ra-
tionale to disability discrimination.221 Customer preferences that per-
tain to authenticity generally only arise in the context of acting or in 
cultivating a desired atmosphere, as in the case of an authentic Chinese 
 
 217.  Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) ("[S]ociety's accumulated 
myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations 
that flow from actual impairment."); Feder v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 319, 333 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[Employers] cannot justify otherwise unlawful discrimination on the ground 
that one's customers do not like to deal with members of a protected class."). 
 218.  Jones, supra note 171, at 494 (predicting that customer preference under the ADA 
would align with the caselaw under Title VII). Similar treatment of ADA and Title VII claims 
would be efficient because employers would only need to comply with a single legal standard. It 
would also be fair because Title VII and ADEA plaintiffs would not be able to recover windfalls 
unavailable to ADA plaintiffs. 
 219.  This proposal is not dramatic. Instead, it essentially recommends that courts comply 
with the text of the ADA, the intentions of the enacting legislature, the ADA's underlying poli-
cies, and the caselaw surrounding antidiscrimination law generally. 
 220.  42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2018). 
 221.  See supra Part I.C.2. 
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restaurant.222 Historical or artistic accuracy may be a compelling rea-
son to allow customer preference-based defenses within the context of 
acting; cultivating an atmosphere that is free of disabled persons is an-
tithetical to the ADA's purpose, however, and so cannot be considered 
a compelling justification.223 Customer preferences that are based on 
aversion to a disabled person's appearance, smell, voice, and so on are 
facially discriminatory, and catering to this kind of animus is likewise 
contrary to the ADA.224 
This proposal could be further refined with regard to safety- and 
authenticity-based defenses. The policies of the ADA are maximized, 
first, when customer preferences are real rather than hypothetical; sec-
ond, when disregarding such preferences would impose significant 
hardship on an employer; and third, when employers must meet a 
heightened duty of accommodation if they wish to cater to subjective 
customer preferences. 
Hypothetical customer preferences are not a compelling reason to 
accept employers' affirmative defenses and have been consistently re-
jected by courts.225 Hypothetical preferences can easily be fabricated 
by employers that wish to discriminate and can be based on faulty as-
sumptions about customer preferences.226 As such, hypothetical pref-
erences can never result in legitimate undue hardship or true business 
necessity.227 
 
 222.  See supra Part I.C.2; see also Util. Workers Union v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 
1262 (C.D. Cal. 1970). 
 223.  See supra Part II.B. 
 224.  See supra Part II.A, Part II.B, and Part II.C. 
 225.  See, e.g., EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 586 (6th 
Cir. 2018) ("We hold . . . that a [defendant] cannot rely on customers' presumed biases.") (em-
phasis added); EEOC v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 917 F. Supp. 419, 427 n.5 (W.D. Va. 1996) (relying 
on deposition testimony which assumed that an employee's disability would negatively affect cus-
tomers), aff'd 104 F.3d 683 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 
303 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (rejecting defendant's claim as "speculative at best"). 
 226.  This is part of the problem with cases like Chico Dairy and Kenny Shoe Corporation, 
which are described in in detail in Part I.C.3. In Chico Dairy, the employer assumed without 
evidence that vendors would be off put by an employee's prosthetic eye. Chico Dairy Co. v. W. 
Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75 (W.Va. 1989). Likewise, in Kenny Shoe Corpora-
tion, the employer's concerns that an employee's seizures would negatively affect customers were 
largely hypothetical. Martinson v. Kenney Shoe Corp., 104 F.3d 683 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 227.  Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. at 303 ("[N]or is there competent proof that the cus-
tomer preference for females is so strong that Defendant's male passengers would cease doing 
business with Southwest . . . ."); Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accom-
modation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1241 (2003) (discussing the 
court's insinuation in Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 798–99 (8th Cir. 1993) that 
defendants must demonstrate the imposition of "a real economic cost"). But see Torres v. Wis. 
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Customer preference-based defenses must also allege significant 
hardship in order to be legally cognizable. In general, prioritizing non-
discrimination against disabled employees at the expense of customer 
preferences is a reasonable accommodation.228 Employers may escape 
this duty if they can show that accommodation would result in undue 
hardship, but this burden must be significant to satisfy the require-
ments of the ADA.229 While employers are not required to venture to 
the verge of bankruptcy to accommodate disabled workers, customer 
preferences must result in more than mere unprofitability.230 Employ-
ers seeking to justify discriminatory employment decisions on the basis 
of customer preferences must therefore prove that sublimating these 
preferences would result in significant undue hardship. 
Customer preferences that are idiosyncratic or subjective should 
be scrutinized even more carefully.231 Employers owe a heightened 
duty to accommodate disabled employees when customer biases 
against them are irrational and based on fear or prejudice. By following 
these recommendations, and limiting defenses based on customer pref-
erences, courts will more fully implement the policies espoused by the 
ADA and more effectively protect the rights of disabled workers. 
fffK=`çåÅäìëáçå=
The United States has a storied history of discrimination against 
persons with disabilities—from the ugly laws of the late-1800s, to ju-
dicially-sanctioned forced sterilization during the 1920s, to the "unfit 
to be seen" exception tacitly accepted by some modern courts. Con-
gress enacted the ADA to combat such undesirable discrimination. 
The ordinary language of the act, its broad remedial purpose, and its 
underlying policies each mitigate in favor of disallowing most forms of 
 
Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (finding that it was unre-
alistic and unfair for the district court to require empirical evidence of the benefits of restricting 
prison guards to only females), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1017 (1989). 
 228.  See supra Part II.A.2. 
 229.  42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2018); see also Weber, supra note 157, at 1150–51. 
 230.  See, e.g., Gerdom v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[C]us-
tomer preference may be taken into account only when it is based on the company's inability to 
perform the primary function or service it offers.") (emphasis added); Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. 
Supp. at 303 (citing Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971)) (raising 
customer preferences as a defense requires "business necessity, not business convenience"). 
 231.  Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1044 (11th Cir. 2000) (Birch, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) ("[C]ourts have examined and should continue to examine subjec-
tive reasons with higher scrutiny than objective reasons."). 
WESTERGARD REVIEWED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2020  9:39 AM 
179]                                                            Customer Preferences  
215 
the customer preference defense. Congress and the courts can uphold 
the ADA's policies and protect persons with disabilities from discrim-
ination by expressly repudiating the "unfit to be seen" strain of this 
defense; they can also further the act's policy goals by adopting height-
ened standards in evaluating all employer defenses that are based on 
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